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The Accountability of Advocacy NGOs: 





Advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in society by 
keeping in check the power of corporations and governments and uncovering rights violations. 
They differ from other NGOs in terms of their agenda, funding structure and the stakeholders 
they serve, and operate in a context characterized by increasing demands for transparency, 
accountability and responsible advocacy. This study examines how the accountability agenda 
of advocacy NGOs is shaped by the need to maintain independence, preserve values and keep 
reputation unsullied when faced with financial and legitimacy pressures. A netnography 
method is employed to analyse the discussions taking place in the NGOs’ online community 
of practice to understand the implications of the accountability challenges faced by advocacy 
NGOs through the perceptions of NGO professionals. The study reveals that the accountability 
agenda of advocacy NGOs is determined by the interrelated threats of financial vulnerability, 
potential loss of independence, legitimacy challenges and the high level of public scrutiny. The 
findings highlight that imperfect accountability mechanisms (e.g. financial reporting and 























Advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aim to promote and campaign for human 
rights, reveal and shame rights abuses and violations, and empower disadvantaged groups 
(Archer, 2003; Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004). The growing power of advocacy NGOs in setting 
international agendas, together with claims for their legitimacy mandates and ‘voice’ 
accountability, brought financial issues of advocacy NGOs under public scrutiny (Brown, 
Ebrahim, & Batliwala, 2012; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). Hortsch (2010), while analysing 
the case of Amnesty International’s campaign Counter Terror with Justice, raised a concern 
for responsible advocacy and indicated that advocacy NGOs must choose their partners and 
donors prudently and be transparent and explicit in signalling their accountability. Hammer, 
Rooney, and Warren (2010) emphasized the need for “ethical fundraising, non-reliance on a 
narrow funding base” (p. 18) and the importance of advocacy NGOs not compromising their 
missions and values while constructing relationships with fund providers.  
When the integrity of advocacy NGOs comes under public scrutiny, the ‘naming and shaming’ 
strategy that advocacy NGOs apply to human rights violators might well be turned against their 
own organizations and could challenge their own legitimacy (Schmitz et al., 2012; Dhanani & 
Connolly, 2015). Society expects advocacy NGOs to express their core values not only in their 
programmes but also in their fundraising and accountability strategies. Advocacy NGOs have 
to select their partners and affiliates carefully to mitigate any problem of interference and 
influence of NGOs’ missions, agenda and independence. Such selectiveness and prudence trap 
advocacy NGOs into resource dependence and make them more vulnerable to financial shocks 
than other types of NGOs (Khieng & Dahles, 2015; Verbruggen, Christiaens, & Milis, 2011).  
While prior studies have viewed NGO accountability via its instrumentality and mechanisms 
(Assad & Goddard, 2010; Ebrahim, 2003), it is only quite recently that researchers have started 
to examine accountability contexts through the prism of conversations and dialogues 
(Agyemang, O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Awumbila, 2017; Dhanani & Connolly, 2015) and explore 
accountability discourses in social networking platforms (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Gallhofer, 
Haslam, Monk, & Roberts, 2006; Jeacle & Carter, 2011). The main objective of this study is 
to enrich our understanding of the accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs by examining how 
it is shaped by the need to  preserve organisational values,  independence and unsullied 
reputation despite the extreme vulnerability to funding, high accountability demands and 
legitimacy threats. The study approaches these complex issues from the perceptions of 
advocacy NGO practitioners on obstacles and challenges that they encounter in their everyday 
practice. It draws on the knowledge generated by these practitioners through dialogue and 
naturally created discussions on online social networking platforms.  
This study uses a netnography method which involves analysing interactions and discussions 
in five openly accessed online platforms located on LinkedIn. As the first Internet-based 
platform primarily focused on networking and interactions based on professional identity, 
LinkedIn enables professionals from all over the world to gather in online communities of 
practice, thematic groups and forums to discuss and debate practices and viewpoints in an 
informal and trustful manner (Claybaugh & Haseman, 2013; Komljenovic, 2018). Non-profit 
accountants, managers and fundraisers utilize the online groups to engage in dialogue with 
fellow professionals, to share knowledge of accountability concerns and to rely on each other’s 
expertise in seeking practical solutions. The content of LinkedIn profiles makes it possible to 
identify advocacy NGO professionals. These aspects determine the rationale behind selecting 
this source of data to fulfil the research objective of this study.  
As a relational practice, NGO accountability has tended to be studied with an emphasis on the 
perceptions of various stakeholders (Assad & Goddard, 2010; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015) or 
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through revealing accountability practices and discourses within NGOs (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008). This study mobilizes the notion of community, forum and togetherness of NGO 
professionals on an inter-organizational level and examines the accountability challenges 
advocacy NGOs face by obtaining valuable insights from the discussions NGO professionals 
consider worth creating online. As advocacy NGOs and activists have utilized social media for 
the mobilization of social movements and ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns and the provision 
of counter accounts and alternative viewpoints (Gallhofer, et al., 2006; Olsson, 2008), it is also 
of interest to examine whether social media and networking platforms are effective instruments 
for building a sense of an NGO professional community to exchange knowledge and practices. 
The findings indicate that the online community of practice is an important arena that NGO 
practitioners use to discuss complex accountability issues of interest to their organizations. The 
study shows that the everyday accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs is shaped by the need 
to formally satisfy upward accountability demands of donors and to protect organizational 
values and independence by avoiding unethical fundraising approaches and donors’ 
interference with NGOs’ agendas and rejecting grants and donations that could bring into 
question their reputations and legitimacy mandates. The extreme level of fundraising 
competition and resource dependence have forced advocacy NGOs to adopt a business 
approach to fundraising and to hire accounting and fundraising consultants to enable them to 
comply with the complex requirements of financial disclosure and performance management. 
Despite their financial vulnerability and increasing expectations from the public, advocacy 
NGOs have had to divert their time and scarce financial resources from their core missions to 
mundane accountability practices, which may hinder their ability to demonstrate holistic 
accountability.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents an analytical 
framework for understanding the accountability of advocacy NGOs. Section 3 describes the 
research methods used to collect and analyse data. Section 4 presents the main findings of this 
study. The final section discusses the implication of the findings and draws some conclusions. 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Advocacy NGOs: missions, agenda, financial vulnerability and independence threats 
Prior studies have segmented NGOs and used diverse methods to understand accountability 
issues, for example, in specific contexts (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008), effective regulation 
(Cordery, Sim, & Zijl, 2017), and self-regulation of NGOs (Hammer, et al., 2010; Lloyd, 2005). 
According to the widely used classification of Cousins (1991), NGOs can be represented by 
four types of orientation: charitable, service, participatory, and empowering. The United 
Nations in its Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (UN, 
2003) introduces the nine-group NGO classification that includes advocacy NGOs. Advocacy 
NGOs do not constitute a homogeneous group. Ball, Girouard, and Chapman (1997) identify 
six types of advocacy NGOs: governmental human rights bodies; inter-governmental and 
regional organizations; international advocacy NGOs; regional, national, or local NGOs; quasi-
governmental truth commissions; and national or international criminal tribunals. This study 
considers international and national (local) human rights organizations, empowering NGOs 
and, to a great extent, civil society organizations and social movement organizations to belong 
to the category of advocacy NGOs. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Transparency International, Greenpeace, Anti-Slavery International and Helsinki Committees 
for Human Rights are among the most well-known advocacy NGOs.  
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Advocacy NGOs make corporations and governments accountable for disclosure of rights 
violations (Hortsch, 2010; Islam & McPhail, 2011; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014), corruption and 
bribery (Islam, Dissanayake, Dellaportas, & Haque, 2018) and compliance with social, 
environmental and ethical standards (Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013; Momin, 2013; Parker, 
2011). They uncover abuses of rights through investigations and independent monitoring, 
‘naming and shaming’, making use of campaign strategies (Bonner, 2005; Davis, Murdie, & 
Steinmetz, 2012; Islam, et al., 2018; Mutua, 2001), and mobilizing the community and the 
public to apply pressures on regulators and key actors in society (Brown, et al., 2012; Hammer, 
et al., 2010). Advocacy NGOs use accounting information (including counter-accounts, 
shadow accounts and social audit) in anti-bribery, anti-corruption and social movement 
campaigns to facilitate democratic change (Apostol, 2015; Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016; 
Cooper, Coulson, & Taylor, 2011; Martinez & Cooper, 2017). They undertake ‘naming and 
shaming’ campaigns (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hendrix & Wong, 2013; Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, 
& Nichols, 2012) such as spotlighting human rights violators and abusers (Hafner-Burton, 
2008), and collaborate with traditional and online media in order to create synergies and raise 
awareness of issues of public interest.  
Publicity campaigns put pressures on governments and corporations to avoid or reduce abusive 
and corrupt practices, and to increase transparency and disclosure (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; 
Deegan & Islam, 2014). In the international arena, advocacy NGOs have obtained official 
consultative status from transnational organizations (Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004), which allows 
them to influence public opinion and policy formation. They are often called ‘watchdogs’ 
which have “to occupy an uncomfortable space between state forces, the global governance 
system, and the private sector” (Hortsch, 2010, p. 129).  
Preserving and protecting organizational authenticity and independence of judgements, 
agendas and activism are of paramount importance to advocacy NGOs for “building pressure 
and creating international machinery to end the [human rights] violations and to hold 
governments [and businesses] accountable” (Gaer, 1995, p. 394; Hammer, et al., 2010). 
Paradoxically, advocacy NGOs face a higher level of financial vulnerability than other types 
of NGOs. Most advocacy NGOs are dependent on external funding and face tough fundraising 
competition (Dhanani & Connolly, 2015; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017; Schmitz, Raggo, & 
Bruno-van Vijfeijken, 2012; Verbruggen, et al., 2011). Other types of NGOs rely on revenues 
from various sources, including individual and corporate donations, grants, governmental 
transfers and to some extent on commercial activities (selling goods or charging service fees) 
(Anheier, 2014; Khieng & Dahles, 2015). However, the revenue sources of advocacy NGOs 
are limited, as they do not carry out commercial activities to raise revenues, and they typically 
rely on paid professionals instead volunteers.  
Advocacy NGOs are usually less attractive for individual donors than charities (Ron, Pandya, 
& Crow, 2016). Funding for the concrete time-bound projects of advocacy NGOs comes from 
the European Commission and United Nations and a small number of independent foundations, 
including the Ford Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), MacArthur 
Foundation, and Open Society Foundation (Höhn, 2012; Mutua, 2001). Moreover, in contrast 
with other NGOs that can accept governmental funding, many advocacy NGOs have to stay 
financially independent from governments and powerful groups (Gaer, 1995; Mutua, 2001; 
O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008): 
 
Those [advocacy NGOs] who reject government funds cite concerns for their 
independence of action and thought. It seems fair to conclude that to be considered 
for acceptance, financial support must come from an industrial democracy with a 
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commitment to promoting human rights abroad; presumably, support from … 
clearly authoritarian states, would be unacceptable (Mutua, 2001, p. 154). 
 
In sum, advocacy NGOs have to operate in a situation of interrelated threats of financial 
vulnerability and potential loss of their independence of actions and judgements. Careful 
consideration of donors and partners is crucial for advocacy NGOs for many reasons, including 
public scrutiny and accountability demands and, especially, reputational threats of shady and 
controversial affiliations and interference, and, most importantly, the need for the constant 
pursuit of independence. Advocacy NGOs have a restricted pool of revenue sources, which 
makes them more financially vulnerable than other types of NGOs (Saidel, 1991; Trussel, 
Greenlee, & Brady, 2002). This problem is compounded by the financial accountability 
demands placed upon them by their donors while preserving their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. These issues are discussed next. 
 
2.2. Financial accountability and legitimacy challenges of advocacy NGOs  
NGOs’ accountability is relational (Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, & O'Dwyer, 2009; 
Bovens, 2007; Hortsch, 2010), context-specific (Höhn, 2012; Martinez & Cooper, 2017), and 
riddled with complexities (Candler, 2001; Mulgan, 2000). NGOs’ relational accountability 
may be upwards (to donors), downwards (to beneficiaries) or holistic (Agyemang, et al., 2009; 
Anheier, 2014; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; O’Leary, 2017; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006). 
While functional accountability narrowly focuses on project activities and financial 
performance indicators (Agyemang, et al., 2009), holistic accountability reconciles upward and 
downward accountability with mission, sustainability and the social impacts of NGOs’ 
activisms. 
Society expects advocacy NGOs to be accountable for their values (Kilby, 2006) and preserve 
their identities, authenticity (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006), ‘voices’ and representativeness 
(Hammer, et al., 2010; Höhn, 2012; Wade, 2009). They are expected to build their credentials 
based on their values and ideologies in order to be able to promote a world-view on human 
rights and speak on behalf of society. Advocacy NGOs aim to obtain and keep a ‘social 
contract’ or a legitimacy mandate with society. In this respect, the International Council on 
Human Rights Policy asserts that “[advocacy NGOs’] success, even survival, depends 
significantly on their ability … to demonstrate that they respect their own values” (Archer, 
2003, p. 49) not only in their professional agendas, but also in terms of their financial integrity.  
The challenges of legitimacy arise from the fact that advocacy NGOs have not been elected to 
represent and speak on behalf of society. For other types of NGOs, such as charities or 
humanitarian and development aid organizations, legitimacy mandates come from their 
abilities to effectively fulfil needs not addressed by the public or private sectors. The agendas 
and policies that the advocacy NGOs defend and advocate for are often politically motivated, 
which makes their legitimacy the most controversial, unstable and sensitive.    
In addition, the application of a rights-based approach by international institutions and NGOs 
have changed perceptions of advocacy and human rights activism (Hansen & Sano, 2006). The 
rights-based approach integrates human rights principles into measures of global change and 
asserts that all people are ‘rights holders’. Therefore, ‘duty bearers’ are indebted to protect their 
rights. It increases demand for accountability not only for state authorities, but also for NGOs 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; O’Leary, 2017) and ‘duty bearers’ acknowledge “social 
accountability initiatives … as mechanisms for securing a new social contract” (Bukenya, 
2016, p. 1162; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2007).  
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Because public expectations of advocacy NGOs are high, any sign of compromising values or 
inappropriate financial behaviour would be spotlighted by ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns 
in the media, leading to reputational damage and operational collapse due to public 
stigmatizing and a decrease in donations; in other words, “survival and legitimacy go hand by 
hand” (Deegan & Islam, 2014, p. 400). For example, the financial scandals involving well-
known NGOs, such as Kids Company, BeatBullying, OXFAM, Bishop Estate, Feed the 
Children, Women’s Royal Voluntary Service, Foundation for Peace and Justice and many 
others, resulted in a legitimacy crisis in the non-profit sector (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; 
Bothwell, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011; Fassin, 2009; Cordery et al., 2017; Keating & 
Thrandardottir, 2016) and increasing demand for the financial accountability and transparency 
of NGOs (Schlesinger et al., 2004; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). One of the most remarkable 
advocacy NGO financial scandals is the case of the International Helsinki Federation for 
Human Rights, which filed for bankruptcy and consequently closed down due to massive fraud, 
economic crime and the embezzlement of €1.2 million by its financial manager (Trivunovic, 
2011).  
Upward and downward forms of accountability are interdependent, at least in relation to the 
allocation of resources that NGOs spend in order to signal their accountability and fulfil 
accountability demands. The predominant focus on hierarchical accountability could lead to a 
trend “to measure impacts mechanically, in order to provide an impression of precision” 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, p. 804). However, too much of a focus on downward 
accountability might make advocacy NGOs look like service-oriented organizations to 
particular groups of recipients. This might be dangerous for the missions of those international 
advocacy NGOs that do not represent any particular population in their mission outreach but 
are campaigning against human rights violations worldwide.  
In sum, multiplicity of the forms of and demands for accountability, accompanied by a high 
level of public scrutiny, expectations and legitimacy challenges, creates substantial pressures 
on advocacy NGOs. Even though NGO accountability research tends to highlight the 
importance of downward accountability (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; O’Leary, 2017), it is 
often unclear which type and form of accountability advocacy NGOs should prioritize. The 
next subsection discusses the mechanisms available to advocacy NGOs to meet their upward, 
downward and lateral accountability. 
 
2.3. Accountability mechanisms: stakeholder expectations, financial truthfulness and 
mission-based performance  
Accountability expectations are discharged through a forum “in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct; the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 447). The ‘forum’ of 
advocacy NGOs comprises different groups of stakeholders who voice their interests, demands 
and expectations (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). The choice of 
accountability mechanisms depends on organizational type, structure, missions and activities 
(Agyemang, et al., 2009; Boomsma, O'Dwyer, Bebbington, & Unerman, 2014; Ebrahim, 
2003). Table 1 provides an overview of advocacy NGOs’ external stakeholders. A particular 












The core mission of advocacy NGOs is to target beneficiaries, to provide 





The most salient stakeholders when it comes to financial accountability 
(Assad & Goddard, 2010).  
Two groups of donors may be identified according to their accountability 
demands (Archer, 2003; Keating & Frumkin, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008):  
‘Non-professional’ (mostly private) donors, who are inspired by the 
mission and the reputation of advocacy NGOs and are mostly driven by 
emotions and intuition. 
Foundations and grant providers, which express high levels of concern 
about advocacy NGOs’ financial issues (Saxton, Kuo, & Ho, 2012; 
Verbruggen, et al., 2011), demand special financial control and reporting 
(Archer, 2003; Keating & Frumkin, 2003), and arrange financial 
inspections (Assad & Goddard, 2010). These demands shape not only the 
activities of the concrete NGOs they support, but also the whole field of 
advocacy, social movement and human rights activism (Martinez & 
















International institutions can function as financial providers, but most 
importantly, they create the arenas where advocacy NGOs might play 
semi-official roles, share the results of their investigations and affect 
decision-making processes (Matlary, 2002).  
Independent monitoring bodies are intermediary agents between donors 
and NGOs. They provide information about financial health, 
accountability, transparency and the performance of NGOs, and they 
advise donors on how to choose reliable NGOs (Schmitz, et al., 2012); 
positive ratings of NGOs usually increase donor contributions (Krishnan, 
Yetman, & Yetman, 2006; Sloan, 2009). 
At the national level, advocacy NGOs deal with legislative and executive 
agents: parliaments and governments. Advocacy NGOs try to avoid 
political or financial affiliations with governments (Archer, 2003; 
O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008), especially in developing and transitional 
countries. However, even functionally independent advocacy NGOs are 
obliged to report on their activities to government authorities.  
 
Prior studies examining donors’ expectations of advocacy NGOs have found that donors 
conceive accountability narrowly and may have political preferences when allocating funds. 
For example, Höhn (2012) emphasized that “donors … [consider] accountability as an icon of 
democracy, but in practice often focus on a much narrower definition of accountability as 
financial auditing” (p. 380). Lebovic and Voeten (2009) claimed that “despite … [donors’] 
self-proclaimed commitment to human rights … [funding] allocations are largely based on the 
political objectives of donors” (p. 82). 
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Transparency and disclosure of accounting information and accountability processes are the 
cornerstones of improving legitimacy in society (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Saxton, et al., 
2012). Greater accountability, disclosure and transparency (Schmitz, et al., 2012; Sloan, 2009) 
may be achieved through compliance with accounting standards (Verbruggen, et al., 2011) and 
provision of clear financial information (Schlesinger, Mitchell, & Gray, 2004).  
NGOs’ claim of financial accountability has a strong reputational effect, sends a positive signal 
to stakeholders, builds trust and minimizes risk in financial relationships (Offenheiser & 
Holcombe, 2003). In this respect, Saxton, et al. (2012) argue that through “voluntary disclosure 
of pertinent financial and performance-related information, organizations are able to signal 
their efficiency, effectiveness, credibility, responsiveness, and, most importantly, their 
accountability, to current and potential stakeholders” (p. 1066). Hammer, et al. (2010) reported 
on over 30 self-regulation initiatives of advocacy NGOs in relation to improving their own 
accountability, financial transparency and disclosure. However, there are challenges for NGOs 
related to the implementation of private sector accounting frameworks and concepts, which 
may require an accounting framework tailored for their unique needs (Crawford, Morgan, & 
Cordery, 2018; Ryan, Mack, Tooley, & Irvine, 2014). 
NGOs often discharge accountability to their stakeholders by providing performance 
information and their administrative costs, although the choice of performance indicators may 
be contentious. Van Der Heijden (2012) suggested using a statement of functional expense that 
splits NGO’s expenses into three groups: programme, administration and fundraising. 
Independent monitoring bodies, such as Charity Navigator, usually set a threshold of 25% for 
effective NGOs’ administrative and fundraising expenses. Yet these thresholds can motivate 
NGOs to manipulate their accounting numbers (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Offenheiser & 
Holcombe, 2003; Trussel, 2003). For instance, Krishnan, et al. (2006) found that more than 
50% of all US NGOs report zero fundraising expenses.  
In addition to programme, administrative and fundraising effectiveness, advocacy NGOs’ 
effectiveness may be evaluated through measures such as public recognition, trust and support, 
media coverage and achievement of specific targets (Archer, 2003), although these criteria may 
be difficult to quantify. Cingranelli and Richards (2001) reported that they were not aware of 
“any attempt to objectively measure the effort expected by … [advocacy NGOs] in trying to 
change the human rights practices of a target government”, and as such recommended 
advocacy NGOs to measure the “resources [that] have been spent trying to change the human 
rights practices” (p. 232). 
In sum, performance management and financial reporting are important mechanisms to 
demonstrate NGOs’ accountability. However, there is considerable ambiguity regarding the 
ability of these mechanisms to empower advocacy NGOs and enable them to meet their 
growing accountability demands. In addition to addressing this aspect, the study aims to 
examine the accountability agenda, concerns and challenges of advocacy NGOs shaped by the 
interrelated threats of financial vulnerability, potential loss of independence and legitimacy 
challenges by acknowledging the voice of the community of advocacy NGOs professionals. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Research method 
The study fulfils its objective of enriching our understanding of accountability challenges, 
concerns and practices of advocacy NGOs by drawing on the knowledge generated in the NGO 
online community of practice. In line with research on online platforms in creating visibility 
for accountability and social, environmental and dialogic accounting (Bellucci & Manetti, 
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2017; Jeacle & Carter, 2011), this study contributes to the debate on NGO accountability by 
viewing the accountability of advocacy NGOs through interactions and dialogues of the 
members of inter-organizational community of practitioners located on LinkedIn.  
Communities of practice, or CoPs, are “groups of people who share a common interest” 
(Gilbert, 2016, p. 1214; Wenger, 2000) and gather for learning, knowledge generation and 
exchange, and endorsement of professional identity (Dubé, Bourhis, & Jacob, 2005; Duguid, 
2005). Traditional CoPs have been limited to certain geographical locations; however, the 
emergence of the Internet and social media has transformed and extended communicative 
interactions and engagements by enabling people to gather online regardless of physical 
location (Gilbert, 2016; Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Kozinets, 2002). In contemporary society, 
online social networking platforms such as Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube and Twitter have 
become important forums for sharing and communicating experiences and viewpoints. From 
their traditional ‘offline’ predecessors, online communities inherited the notion of reciprocity 
and belonging (Gilbert, 2016), informality, trust and reliability among participants (Claybaugh 
& Haseman, 2013; Jeacle & Carter, 2014). In addition to this, they enable the empowering of 
their members through “iterative mutual learning processes that are designed to promote 
transformative action” (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017, p. 875) and “helping modify the fabric of 
communal practices” (Gallhofer, et al., 2006, p. 684). 
Powerful network configurations and social media attributes transformed conceptualization of 
society (Castells, 2002; Olsson, 2008) and, unsurprisingly, triggered growing research interest 
in the virtual space of social interactions and new types of data (Jeacle & Carter, 2011, 2014; 
Kozinets, Scaraboto, & Parmentier, 2018). Accounting scholars utilized data from online 
networking platforms for research on stakeholder engagement, corporate, social and 
environmental accountability issues, and dialogic and counter accounting (Bellucci & Manetti, 
2017; Gallhofer, et al., 2006; Jeacle & Carter, 2011, 2014). The analysis of online data goes by 
many names, such as ‘social media listening’, ‘Internet mediated research’ or ‘virtual 
ethnography’ (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Jeacle & Carter, 2011). This paper adopts a 
netnography method which originates from digital media marketing and consumer behaviour 
research and has the potential “to provide a means by which all social science scholars may 
observe a host of human behaviour” (Jeacle & Carter, 2011, p. 296): 
Netnography is … a written account resulting from fieldwork studying the cultures 
and communities that emerge from online, computer mediated, or internet-based 
communications, where both the fieldwork and the textual account are 
methodologically informed by the traditions and techniques of cultural 
anthropology (Cova & Pace, 2006, p. 1092). 
In contrast with other qualitative methods, netnography provides an opportunity to observe a 
large number of participants around the world as they engage in discussions based on their own 
interests. It is also less obtrusive (Langer & Beckman, 2005), minimizes respondents’ 
misreporting (Lee & Woodliffe, 2010) and the effect of the interviewer (with its potential for 
bias) on their opinions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Kozinets, 2015) and provides 
researchers with an opportunity to collect ‘contextually rich’ data (Kozinets, 2002).  
 
3.2. Data collection and analysis 
This study mobilized netnography to capture engagement in dialogue, interactions and sharing 
of knowledge and concerns on accountability (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017) in five online 
professional groups located on LinkedIn. Being the first and the largest social media platform 
that persuades engagement based on professional identity rather than entertainment, LinkedIn 
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is acknowledged for the reliability of information about both individual members and 
accumulated statistics (Komljenovic, 2018) and for its environment with a high level of trust 
among the members (Claybaugh & Haseman, 2013). The preliminary screening of all available 
non-profit community groups on LinkedIn enabled the author to identify ‘open’ (the 
discussions are fully seen, shared and discovered on the Web) and ‘closed’ (the content is 
visible only to members) groups. As of October 2012, the publicly accessible (‘open’) and 
daily-active groups of NGO practitioners on LinkedIn were selected for this study, namely 
Mango Worldwide (MNG), Governmental – Not-for-Profit Accounting and Auditing Issues 
(GNPAAI), Non-profit Accounting & Grant Management (NPA&GM), Charity UK (C_UK), 
and UK Fundraising (F_UK).  
According to the ethical standards of netnography (Kozinets, 2002, 2015), “manual, non-
automated access of information on publicly available web pages should be acceptable without 
special permission” (Allen, Burk, & Davis, 2006, p. 607). “Taking a cautious position on the 
private-versus-public medium issue” (Langer & Beckman, 2005, p. 193), and considering the 
practitioners to be the authors of their own statements, the author has collected written consents 
that allow direct quotations. The group members who approved the direct quotations agreed to 
be quoted with their real names, which in itself supports respondents’ validation of this piece 
of research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). However, the quotations were anonymised to 
preserve the privacy and confidentiality of the practitioners. 
At the first stage of analysis, the author analysed the content of available discussions based on 
their relevance to the context of advocacy NGOs’ accountability. The first-stage database 
includes 120 discussions. A ‘discussion’ is defined as a single conversation (‘thread’) on a 
given topic. All available discussions were collected from the dates of the groups’ creation or 
opening for the public (see Table 2). To preserve the authenticity of the discussions and 
maintain a neutral perspective in the research, the author did not engage with the studied 
community. The dataset consists of the discussions of accounting, management and consultant 
professionals employed by different NGOs. To maintain reasonable confidence in the 
professional identity of the participants, the author traced the personal information that they 
provided on LinkedIn (such as names and affiliations) and compared this data with the 
information available on their employers’ web-pages.  
The NGO online community of practice portrays an impression of a professional and reliable 
network with a knowledge ‘entry fee’ (i.e. the group members appear to have sufficient 
knowledge, education and experience to discuss specific accounting and accountability issues). 
The group participants demonstrated a low level of emotionality, used professional language 
and discussed professional subjects. The group members identified themselves as professionals 
by establishing credibility among themselves and offering their expert advice and opinions. 
The content of their discussions shows that the participants considered the groups as suitable 
places for addressing the everyday issues and challenges of NGO accountability, engaging in 
dialogues and seeking practical advice from each other. The issues of concern for each group 
are listed in Table 2. By linking the professional majority in each group to the issues of concern 
identified within the same group (see Table 2), it is observable that managers, accountants and 
fundraisers are concerned about different but interrelated issues, with each group’s interests 
sharing some overlap with another group but also having distinctive concerns differentiated 
from those of the other groups. For instance, the group dealing with financial and project 
management in developing countries (MNG group) are concerned about corruption issues; 
consultants and fundraisers (UK_F and C_UK groups) are mainly focused on fundraising 
strategies and relationships with donors; accountants from NPA&GM and GNPAAI groups 
focus on accounting, reporting and control. 
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Advocacy NGO professionals consider themselves to be part of the larger online non-profit 
communities of practice. In order to ensure that the dataset can provide reliable and relevant 
information about advocacy NGO practitioners, the author identified two types of informants 
in the studied groups: “informants who are especially sensitive to the area of concern and the 
more-willing-to-reveal informants” (Dean, Eichhorn, & Dean, 1969, p. 285). The first type of 
informants included members who created discussions by highlighting issues of concern to 
them; the second type of informants contributed to the discussions by responding to the issues. 
The informants in the dataset comprised: professionals employed by advocacy NGOs, 
including ecological, women’s and children’s NGOs with dominant empowering and advocacy 
components in their mission statements – 42.5%; professional accountants and fundraisers who 
work for all types of NGOs – 30%; charity employees – 12.5%; religious NGOs’ employees – 
10%; professionals who are employed by other types of NGOs – 5%. It can be noted that 
practitioners employed by advocacy NGOs had a strong presence in the voluntary online 
discussion forums and were keen to engage in dialogue about accountability issues.  
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The study does not attempt to generalize, but to understand accountability issues faced by 
advocacy NGOs. In the second stage of analysis, the statements of advocacy NGOs’ employees 
and professional accountants and fundraisers (with traceable experience of working for 
advocacy NGOs) were extracted from the originally selected discussions. These statements 
(165) formed a second-stage dataset and were used to address this study’s objective. Analysis 
and interpretation of netnographic data is “based primarily on the observation of textual 
discourse” (Kozinets, 2002, p. 64) and consists of “classification, coding analysis and 
contextualization” (Langer & Beckman, 2005, p. 193). The author followed the steps of Langer 
and Beckman (2005, p. 197) in analysis of the statements in the second dataset: 
The body of the entire text was read through several times. Emergent 
conceptualisations were altered on successive readings. The material was 
structured, coded and summarized, then explained and interpreted. Multiple 
coding of the topical focus of the postings was supplemented with … identity 
information about the contributor.  
All statements were analysed manually. The text of particular statements were interpreted 
through the identification of patterns and issues of concern (Belk, Fischer, & Kozinets, 2012) 
in order to prioritize the focus on the meanings shaped in the discussions (Lukka & Modell, 
2010), rather than on the forms of expression or the word choices made by the participants 
(Kozinets, 2015). The plausibility of explanations is achieved by applying several rounds of 
analysis (Kozinets, 2015), presenting multiple and contrasting explanations and elements of 
respondents’ validation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), and giving voice to the ‘Others’ 
(Lukka & Modell, 2010), that is, to the advocacy NGO practitioners, accountants, managers 
and fundraisers in order to view the accountability challenges of advocacy NGOs through the 
eyes of their employees engaged in informal and trustful discussions with fellow professionals. 
 
4. FINDINGS 
This section presents the study’s findings on different interlinked aspects of advocacy NGOs’ 
accountability revealed in conversations and discussions on the analysed online networking 
platforms. This section is structured as follows. The first subsection exposes through the eyes 
of NGO professionals how financial pressures and vulnerabilities affect the accountability 
agenda of advocacy NGOs. The second subsection discusses issues relating to preserving the 
values and independence of advocacy NGOs, while signalling accountability and engaging 
with stakeholders. The final subsection highlights the challenges of applying existing 
accountability mechanisms (such as financial reporting and performance management systems) 
faced by advocacy NGOs. 
 
4.1. Implications of financial vulnerability for the accountability agenda of advocacy 
NGOs 
This subsection discusses two themes revealed in the analysis: a shift towards upward 
accountability while neglecting accountability to beneficiaries and implications of extensive 
competitive pressures on the accountability and fundraising agenda of advocacy NGOs.  
Upward and downward accountability. The analysis demonstrates that, although advocacy 
NGO practitioners acknowledged the need for their organizations to be accountable to multiple 
stakeholders, most attention and priority was paid to donors and upward accountability issues. 
Figure 1, which shows a ‘word cloud’ (a visual representation of the dataset), demonstrates the 
strong focus that NGOs place on their donors. The word cloud is created by the incorporation 
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of all textual data from the second-stage dataset into the Wordle program and shows the 
frequency of each term by the size of the word. Advocacy NGOs’ practitioners discussed 
relationships with donors and the importance of donations for sustainable operationalization 
more frequently than other issues (the appearance of the word ‘donor(s)’ is highest (17%) 
among all concepts mentioned in the dataset).  
 
 
Figure 1: A dataset word cloud  
 
The findings reveal that NGOs treat individual and institutional (organizational) donors 
differently. The major source of funding determines the type of fundraising strategy and the 
ways to approach donors and signal accountability to them. The practitioners who represent 
the organizations relying on funding from individual donors claimed that the implementation 
of different motivational techniques is more effective for attracting donors than a 
demonstration of financial performance: 
You need to present the need in a way that is emotive and compelling. Then you 
can argue that your organization has the solution, and needs money to implement 
it (a fundraising consultant, UK, GNPAAI group). 
 
Therefore, advocacy NGOs oriented towards individual donors or members would be more 
likely to signal their accountability by using various visual attributes of accountability (such as 
flyers and presentations) and approaching their donors directly and informally (stands, 
fundraising dinners, phone calls) in order to convert past ‘stories of success’ into future revenue 
streams. Financial performance indicators and effectiveness would be much less important for 
addressing donors and would only be needed for maintaining a positive and sustainable public 
image to support the NGOs’ legitimacy and trustworthiness. The financial scandals in the past 
reveal (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017) that in situations when 
donors are not interested in scrutinizing the financial performance and financial accountability 
of the NGOs they support, there is a higher risk of financial fraud and mis-reporting of 
performance, which once disclosed in the media would cause such organizations to collapse. 
In contrast, organizations financed by institutional funds focus on developing a more 
systematic and structured approach in donor relationships and upward accountability. For 
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example, MNG group members discussed the best approaches for preparing grant applications 
when an emotional component is not important and formal criteria are used: 
I’m trying to develop a tool to help organizations decide whether or not to bid for 
different grants. … Questions I have so far are ‘Is this proposal in line with existing 
organizational strategies? … Does this proposal add significant … added value to 
the existing strategies which make it worth considering? … Is the donor of longer-
term strategic interest? (an NGO consultant, UK, MNG group).  
 
This situation is typical for the majority of advocacy NGOs, especially those in Europe, where 
the level of private donations is lower than in the USA and organizations mostly rely on grants 
from institutional foundations. Such NGOs would aim to build a long-lasting relationship with 
a particular donor organization to secure its funding. There is a risk of them being accused of 
relying on a narrow group of funders, building too close affiliations and compromising their 
own independence and agenda in order to satisfy donors’ requirements. In addition, the formal 
and structured mechanisms of financial accountability (which are discussed in subsection 4.3) 
would be more relevant for those organizations. 
In contrast to an exaggerated focus on upward accountability issues, the analysis revealed only 
a few statements focused on the interests of beneficiary groups. The study did not identify any 
specific discussions dedicated to downward accountability. There could be various reasons for 
this. First, many advocacy NGOs are working on short-term projects with a flexible agenda 
depending on emerging socio-political challenges in various contexts, and, therefore, even 
though the practitioners seem to be able to identify the purpose and mission of their activities, 
it might be difficult to identify the beneficiary groups precisely. Second, the opportunistic 
utilization of online platforms causes discussing and seeking advice on the most urgent and 
burning accountability issues:  
Donors definitely ask more questions today … It gets us in the habit of 
answering/reporting back. And that’s something we should be doing. When we 
demonstrate to our donors that we’re effective, and they can see the impact of their 
gifts, they’re more likely to continue to give (a director of development, USA, 
NPA&GM group). 
 
This quote reveals that the everyday agenda of advocacy NGO practitioners is preoccupied 
with the need to ensure the stability and continuity of revenue streams and formally designed 
accountability to existing donors. Therefore, the needs of the most salient and powerful 
stakeholders are prioritized, and less powerful stakeholders are downgraded. It is also 
important to interpret this aspect in the knowledge that all discussions on online networking 
platforms are created and moderated by the practitioners based on their own interests and 
information needs. The netnographic approach allowed pure naturalistic observation and 
averted any danger of guiding participants towards discussing downward accountability issues.  
Competitive pressures and business approaches. The findings of this study show that 
resource dependence and extremely tough fundraising competition force advocacy NGO 
managers to mobilize business approaches to fundraising, which is reflected in the concepts 
and terminology used in discussions (such as ‘competition’, ‘donor markets’, ‘branding’, 
‘return on investment (ROI)’). For example, the CEO of an advocacy NGO from the USA 
suggested to his fellows in the GNPAAI group to think ‘like business persons’ and to consider 
donors’ financial support as investments:  
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Fundraising planning should always include the numbers that an NGO is willing 
to invest in generating income, and projected ROI. 
His opinion was supported by a fundraising consultant from the UK:  
Your ROI is far higher in the US than in the UK. You should be prepared to invest 
in donor acquisition, which will not produce net income till year two. Reserves 
should be used to fill the gap. 
 
Several other participants, including an advocacy NGO senior development executive, claimed 
that in order to keep their organizations growing, they used business valuation terms and 
indexes, ROI and SWOT analysis (i.e. identification of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats) in planning fundraising, and surplus revenues that were used for ‘reinvestment’ for 
building ‘revenue generating capacity’.  
The massive acknowledgement of applying ROI and SWOT techniques observed among the 
participants of the studied community signals the risk of opportunistic utilization of 
inappropriate practices. The obvious disadvantage of utilizing the ROI approach, considering 
donors as investors and donations as investments, is a shift and outflow of attention and 
financial resources away from the main missions and targets to the maintenance of stable 
revenue streams. Moreover, the danger of advocacy NGOs being viewed as game players in 
the competitive donor market by non-profit professionals, and extensive reliance on SWOT 
analysis, i.e. identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats compared to other 
‘competitors’ for funding, opens up various precarious compromises, such as making strategic 
choices about the cases for advocacy.  
 
4.2. Protecting organizational values, independence and reputation 
The complexity of the advocacy NGOs’ operationalization and accountability is determined by 
the fact that, even under conditions of extreme resource dependence and financial vulnerability, 
they have to avoid making financial decisions that could harm their values and independence 
of actions and elude any interference that might affect their reputations and legitimacy in the 
eyes of general public. This subsection analyses three themes revealed in the online 
discussions: the ethics of fundraising compensation by results; the dilemma between accepting 
controversial donations and potential reputational harm; and the balance between being 
accountable and transparent for their donors and the independence of agendas. 
Payment by results and NGO values. As the previous subsection revealed, tough fundraising 
competition motivates NGOs to mobilize business approaches and employ professional 
fundraisers and consultants. The idea of ‘paying by results’ or ‘paying commission’ to 
fundraisers has also evolved from the business world where motivational result-oriented 
bonuses and compensations synergize with ideas of profit maximization. However, the 
observed discussions revealed that when the business approach contradicts the original ethics 
and mission of advocacy NGOs, the participants tend to focus on the nature and fundamental 
principles of the non-profit activism and not on the fundraising targets.  
Concerns about whether to tolerate a fundraiser’s compensation based on results were raised 
in several groups. The discussion observed in the NPA&GM group contained 19 statements 
from 10 contributors. Two participants considered the idea of payments by results to be rational 
for the engagement and motivation of fundraisers to achieve certain quantitative targets; two 
others occupied a neutral position. However, the majority of contributors were strongly against 
using result-oriented compensation and stressed the priority of organizational values: 
15 
 
Purpose is the most important thing. We do not want even place our organizations 
in compromising our missions … or promoting self-interest over the common 
good (a director of development, USA, NPA&GM group). 
I think payment on commission is just wrong. … Supposing someone gave £1m, 
they would be furious that a percentage was going to the fundraiser (a fundraising 
consultant, UK, UK_F group). 
 
Even though some participants considered such compensation an effective way to motivate 
fundraisers, they claimed that it could destroy the original nature of non-profit funding 
principles, where supporters donate for the achievement of the NGO’s mission and not because 
of the specific fundraiser. Two other discussants (a director of development in a children-
empowering NGO and a donor relations manager in an advocacy NGO) claimed that 
compensation for fundraising based on results was contrary to the purpose of NGOs to serve 
the public and such compensation could damage stakeholders’ trust and the legitimacy of their 
organizations.  
Financial dependence, reputation and controversial donors. Even in situations of extreme 
financial vulnerability, advocacy NGO practitioners were frequently discussing the need to 
reject certain donations if acceptance could lead to controversial affiliations, compromise of 
values or threats to legitimacy:  
We have received a cheque from the Jimmy Savile Trust1 which I feel obliged to 
first flag up to the trustees. … I would like to be able to tell them how other 
charities have handled JS donations and whether there has been any fallout from 
supporters or press (a fundraising professional, UK, UK_F group).  
My current organization doesn’t take government grants, large grants that would 
compromise the efficacy of our work (a philanthropy officer, USA, NPA&GM 
group). 
 
Therefore, advocacy NGO professionals are aware of the high level of public scrutiny and 
expectations and tend to prioritize the missions, values and independence of their organizations 
instead of stable revenue streams in situations where certain fundraising actions, affiliations or 
interferences could be considered as controversial. 
Transparency and the threat of donors’ interference. The observed discussions were quite 
controversial when participants debated the level of transparency and disclosure that advocacy 
NGOs should provide. Some participants, including the marketing director and programme 
officer of one of the biggest US advocacy NGOs, valued transparency as the core foundation 
for building trusting relationships with donors. Others argued that it was enough for donors to 
know that their funding was supporting core objectives, and donors’ interference in the 
operationalization of NGOs needed to be avoided: 
We had a process … where management set the plan, trustees agreed it, and then 
fundraisers raised the funds to implement it. There was no discussion with donors 
re giving for projects out of budget. We knew better than donors how best to 
                                                          
1 The Jimmy Savile Charitable Trust was a charity foundation established by the UK TV and radio personality 
Jimmy Savile in 1984. During the sexual abuse scandal in 2012, when Savile was accused in multiple sexual 
assault cases, the charity announced redistribution of its funds among other charities and NGOs and its own 
closure. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20038794. 
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achieve our mission. This avoided a lot of argument (a fundraising professional, 
UK, UK_F group). 
Very often [NGOs] have to chase funding for programs and can be ‘forced’ by 
these same funders to take on other programs which are on the periphery of their 
mission (a professional accountant, Canada, GNPAAI group).  
The negative potency of donors’ interference with NGOs’ agendas is a well-known threat in 
the non-profit world (Ebrahim, 2003; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015). The extensive control and 
reporting systems applied by some institutional donors or powerful philanthropists to the NGOs 
they support create a lot of space for potential influence on NGO missions and agendas. Even 
for charities and humanitarian or development aid organizations, donors’ recommendations 
and the declared purposes of grants could lead to a potential need to compromise. In the case 
of advocacy NGOs, which are often engaged in politically controversial cases or fighting 
against regimes or corporations, strong donors’ interference could extinguish, weaken or 
mislead the activism. Therefore, advocacy NGOs have to balance transparency, openness and 
accountability on one side, with avoidance of donors’ interference in terms of target setting, 
direction of activism and agendas on the other side.  
 
4.3. Mechanisms of accountability: challenges and imperfections 
This subsection discusses two themes related to the mechanisms of financial accountability: 
accounting and reporting challenges and performance management. The studied networking 
groups were extensively utilized by the advocacy NGO professionals to share their concerns 
about the mechanisms of accountability available for their organizations and rely on each 
other’s expertise in seeking practical solutions. They engaged in lengthy discussions of the 
imperfections of accounting, reporting and performance management practices, and 
highlighted the challenges they faced in their day-to-day practices. The challenges of using 
existing accountability mechanisms, such as financial reporting and mission-based 
performance, occur because their standards and principles often originate from business-
oriented practices that are not relevant to NGOs.  
Accounting and reporting challenges. Practitioners claimed that many accounting software 
programs available on the market were oriented to business types of transactions and accepted 
payments only against invoices. Therefore, in order to get meaningful reports within the 
existing accounting systems, NGOs need to recognize donors as customers and their 
contributions as sales receipt or invoices: 
How are you entering the donations? Are you entering them as a sales receipt or 
invoices or just connecting them with the donor's name on the deposit screen? (a 
director of administration at an advocacy NGO, USA, NPA&GM group). 
 
In principle, the suggested approach is incorrect, because the donor is not equivalent to the 
customer of a business organization, nor is the donor a beneficiary of NGO activities. Despite 
the discrepancy, accountants use this approach to find a pragmatic solution for the challenges 
they face. 
The members of accounting discussion groups expressed their doubts about whether financial 
reporting in their present form could be an effective tool for signalling accountability, for 
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instance, while discussing the reporting form IRS Form 990 used in the USA for NGOs that 
accept tax-deductible donations:2 
As part of the audit process I have to complete all the questions on the 990. It is a 
pain and I doubt anyone ever reads them (an NGO financial consultant, USA, 
GNPAAI group).  
I have heard some express doubt that funders actually look at the 990, much less 
use it as an informational tool for assessing a non-profit’s performance (an 
accountant at an advocacy NGO, USA, NPA&GM group). 
The 990 is much more complex than years ago. The additional time required to 
work with our auditors to comply with the reporting requirements added to the 
final cost of the audit. I am a CPA … and this report confuses me as well…smaller 
[NGOs] don’t have the funding to afford a skilled in-house Accountant or Finance 
Manager (an NGO accountant, USA, NPA&GM group). 
NGO practitioners claimed that the complexity of accounting standards has had a negative 
effect on the quality of financial reporting and, therefore, on the transparency and 
accountability of NGOs that cannot afford to retain permanently employed accountants. The 
need to hire professional accounting services leads to substantial resource outflows from the 
original missions of advocacy NGOs. 
Performance management. In contrast to the expressed business approach to fundraising, 
advocacy NGOs practitioners do not want to be judged on a business-oriented performance 
measurement. They claim that performance pressures are coming from foundations’ reporting 
requirements and philanthropists with business background who expect the demonstration of 
clear performance indicators from NGOs: 
With changes in foundation and government reporting requirements we are more 
often than not being asked to report on the impact that we have made with the 
funds that we have received (a chief operating officer, USA, NPA&GM group).  
 
The practitioners did not support the idea of using quantitative indicators of performance, 
because it is not always possible to define programme and administrative expenses fairly and 
financial indices do not correspond to the specific nature and goals of their organizations.  
Too often business oriented professionals approach the operations of … [NGOs] 
from a ‘maximize surplus’ or ‘minimize cost’ perspective … [NGOs] need to 
operate from a ‘maximize value’ point of view. Maximize value drives 
reinvestment from cost savings into new opportunities so that available resources 
are fully utilized (an operations and systems manager, Canada, NPA&GM group).  
The non-donors are the ones who create the impression that … [NGOs] spend too 
much on admin, and this is picked up by the media. [NGOs] then get defensive, 
and try to hide the costs (a fundraising consultant, UK, UK_F group). 
 
Several consultants of advocacy NGOs argued that the large NGOs were responsible for setting 
performance standards, based on the thresholds of programme/administrative expenses. Such 
organizations justify fundraising expenses by calling them ‘education’ (for example, when 
                                                          
2 Because most of the accounting group participants are from the US, the major accounting framework that is 
considered is US GAAP. 
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advocacy NGOs provide human rights information on their fundraising flyers) and create 
pressure on other NGOs to show a reduction of administrative costs: 
The largest [NGOs] are the ones who caused us all this trouble by setting a standard 
that they themselves never met. They just called fundraising appeals, ‘education’, 
and spent gobs of money on fundraising … These large [NGOs] make those of us 
who are trying to keep costs down into a terrible joke. They destroy our reputations 
and think of what we could do with those billions of dollars (an NGO consultant, 
USA, NPA&GM group). 
 
In sum, with respect to increasing upward accountability demands, advocacy NGO 
professionals understand that donors are interested in financial trustworthiness and 
demonstrating achievement of external outcomes by using donations. However, the 
practitioners prefer donors to focus on qualitative indicators of performance and provide the 
professionals with freedom in relation to disclosure of decisions. In addition, they are 
concerned that substantial time and financial resources are outflowing to accounting, 
fundraising and consultancy services due to the need to comply with complex requirements of 
financial and performance disclosures. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main mission of advocacy NGOs is to indicate, investigate and signal the effects of 
political and economic decisions on human rights and conditions of disadvantaged groups 
(Brown, et al., 2012; Davis, et al., 2012). It makes these organizations a vital component of 
civil society. The implications of a rights-based approach to development and calls for 
responsible advocacy have drastically increased the accountability demands and pressures on 
advocacy NGOs (Hammer, et al., 2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This study contributes 
to prior research on NGO accountability (Agyemang, et al., 2017; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015) 
by enriching our knowledge and understanding of the accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs 
and examining how it is shaped by the high level of financial vulnerability and the constant 
and continuous needs to pursue their own independence, values and unsullied reputation.  
The mobilized netnography of online networking platforms (Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Manetti & 
Bellucci, 2016) enables this study to extend prior accountability research by exploring the sense 
of an NGO professional community. The findings reveal the notion of forum, togetherness and 
willingness of NGO professionals to engage in dialogues with their fellows, to share knowledge 
of accountability concerns and rely on each other’s expertise in seeking practical solutions on 
an inter-organizational level. The study provides valuable insights into communal crowd-
thinking, developing and sharing collective practices and attitudes in an atmosphere of 
informality and trust, and, therefore, enables us to better understand the phenomenon of 
accountability through the perceptions of the NGO professional community.  
The analysis revealed a plethora of accountability challenges and concerns that advocacy 
NGOs need to address to maintain their legitimacy in society. The findings of the study support 
a claim that financial vulnerability, legitimacy in the eyes of general public, and independence 
are among the main concerns shaping the advocacy NGOs’ accountability agenda. The study 
shows that the pressures of financial vulnerability and public scrutiny of financial matters of 
advocacy NGOs are higher than for other types of NGOs. As with other types of NGOs, the 
advocacy NGOs’ accountability agenda is preoccupied with various formally designed forms 
of upward accountability (Agyemang, et al., 2017; Cordery, et al., 2017; Crawford, et al., 
2018). However, at the same time, even in situations of extreme financial dependence, 
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advocacy NGOs aim to remain independent in decision-making and actions. They attempt to 
control the level of tolerated interference from donors in their operationalization and agenda 
and avoid affiliations with toxic donors in order to signal a commitment to holding themselves 
accountable and demonstrate compliance with their own missions and values. 
In contrast to prior research on downward accountability (Agyemang, et al., 2009; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; O’Leary, 2017), this study has not identified NGOs interest in accountability 
relationships with stakeholders other than the donors. The present study supports the concern 
of Wellens and Jegers (2014) and Schmitz, et al. (2012) about overestimating the importance 
of downward accountability in everyday practices of NGOs and their employees. One of the 
possible explanations for this could be related to the fact that international advocacy NGOs do 
not represent any particular (local) disadvantaged population in their mission outreach, but are, 
in fact, advocates for human rights values globally, reflecting on emerging socio-political 
agendas and challenges.  
The evidence presented in the study demonstrates that increasing fundraising competition 
forces advocacy NGOs to hire professional fundraisers and consultants and to use business 
approaches and terminology. They tend to mobilize investment business practices (such as ROI 
calculation and SWOT analysis) for their fundraising planning and encourage each other to 
think like business people and treat their donors as investors. The extensive reliance of the 
advocacy NGO community on irrelevant business practices oriented on profit maximization 
and winning competitive battles signals a dangerous trend in potential focus and resource 
outflows from the core missions.   
In contrast, however, to Dhanani and Connolly (2015), who claimed that NGOs apply business 
tactics and strategically guide their accountability practices due to self-interest and therefore 
“failed to reflect the fundamental principles … and the values they promote” (p. 632), the 
present study shows a more complex understanding of this aspect in relation to advocacy 
NGOs. The studied discussions revealed that, even though the strongest focus is on funds 
maximization, there are certain business practices that the NGO community finds to be 
contradictory to main values of advocacy activism and, therefore, cannot accept or tolerate 
them. For example, payment by result to fundraisers is certainly able to boost some fundraising 
campaigns but the NGO professional community considers this approach to be highly unethical 
and able to damage public trust and the legitimacy of their organizations.  
The insights revealed by this study are particularly valuable to support the idea of the non-
profit sector’s further segmentation and diversified approach while aiming to understand the 
implications of specificity of the distinctive types of NGOs on policy regulation and self-
regulatory practices (Cordery, et al., 2017; Lloyd, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). The 
requirement to pursue professional independence and deliver on their missions in a situation of 
extreme financial dependence and legitimacy controversies escalates the need to distinguish 
the accountability and operationalization of advocacy NGOs from the accountability of 
charities (Lu Knutsen & Brower, 2010), churches (Laughlin, 1990; McCarthy, 2007) or 
development aid NGOs (O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O’Leary, 2017). Therefore, the study 
argues for softening accountability pressures on advocacy NGOs, listening to the voices of the 
advocacy NGO professionals and acknowledging them as a community of practice for 
developing new diversified lenses on accountability and social expectations of these type of 
organizations. 
In addition, the study demonstrates a linkage between the challenges and complexities in the 
utilization of accountability mechanisms (such as financial disclosure and performance 
management) and the difficulties for advocacy NGOs to demonstrate accountability. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the existing forms of financial disclosure for non-profits are 
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burdened with complexity and controversy, especially in cases of revenue recognition, costs 
allocation and reporting. In this respect, this study contributes to recent claims about the 
irrelevance of the business-oriented accounting frameworks for application in the non-profit 
sector (Crawford, et al., 2018; Ryan, et al., 2014). In addition, advocacy NGO practitioners do 
not support the application of business-oriented (quantitative) indicators for measuring their 
performance. They emphasize the imperfections of existing performance management systems 
that do not accurately represent the success or failure of their organizations, force them to 
manipulate their costs allocation and create the necessity for organizations to hire professional 
fundraisers and consultants. This leads to resource outflows that may detract from the mission 
of the advocacy NGO. This corresponds to previously expressed disagreements concerning 
appropriate performance management systems in the non-profit sector (Agyemang, et al., 2009; 
Hall, 2014). 
In sum, the accountability concerns of advocacy NGO professionals have multiple facets and 
forms of expression. The fact that advocacy NGOs constantly pursue, seek to secure and often 
signal their independence limits the number of their donors and restricts types of tolerable 
resource providers. These constraints render their financial positions more unstable compared 
to other types of NGOs. Within such an environment, there is a need for constant balancing in 
an attempt to cope with the interrelated threats of financial vulnerability and the potential loss 
of independence.  
Several directions could be suggested for further research on the accountability of advocacy 
NGOs. First, the type of observation applied in this study gives an opportunity to collect 
currently available data. For further research, the author suggests the consideration of a higher 
level of interaction with the online-based community of practice. Second, the study has mostly 
focused on external factors shaping the accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs, such as 
dependence from fund providers, the need to fulfil public expectations and protect 
independence of values and actions. However, the study reveals that accountants, managers 
and fundraisers of advocacy NGOs have various issues of concern regarding the accountability 
of their organizations. This diversity could be further explored in terms of internal pressures 
and interactions in shaping organizational accountability. Finally, the findings of this study 
provide a rich background for in-depth case studies on the accountability agenda of advocacy 
NGOs looking at the issues of concern expressed by advocacy NGO practitioners and how 
these concerns could be mediated.  
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